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Consumer Goods Guarantees in the DCFR
CHRISTIAN TWIGG-FLESNER*
ABSTRACT: This article examines the provisions on consumer guarantees as contained 
in the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). It will be argued that while some of 
these provisions may seem sensible at ﬁ rst sight, there appears to be no clear justiﬁ cation 
for their adoption. Drawing on the wider literature on the function of consumer guaran-
tees, it will be suggested that the DCFR provisions have failed to take into account rel-
evant empirical ﬁ ndings and that some of these provisions cannot be supported on the 
basis of this literature. The limited inﬂ uence of the DCFR provisions on consumer guar-
antees on the Acquis review is noted.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Bestimmungen zu Verbraucherg-
arantien im Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). Es wird argumentiert, dass es – 
obwohl viele dieser Bestimmungen scheinbar sinnvoll sind – keine klaren Gründe für 
deren Annahme gibt. Der Beitrag beruft sich auf Forschungsergebnisse über die Funk-
tionen von Verbrauchergarantien, und behauptet, dass solche empirischen Studien 
unzureichend im DCFR berücksichtigt worden sind. Demnach sind einige der DCFR 
Bestimmungen nicht annehmbar. Der beschränkte Einﬂ uss der DCFR Bestimmungen 
wird auf den Acquis review angemerkt.
 1. Introduction
Consumer guarantees1 are commonly given by manufacturers, and also increas-
ingly by retail sellers, whenever certain types of goods are supplied to consumers. 
They are usually free and offer an alternative basis for a consumer to seek a remedy 
if goods develop a fault. They are essentially an integral part of the marketing and 
competitive strategies of a manufacturer or retailer. As they are an important part of 
many consumer sales transactions, one would expect to see some provisions on these 
in any legal framework, and there are several of those in the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR). This article focuses on the provisions of what is Book IV, Part A, 
Chapter 6 in the DCFR published in 2009 (Articles IV.A.-6:101–108).2 These are 
the provisions on ‘consumer goods guarantees’. Although the provisions contained 
in this chapter seem fairly sensible, it will be argued that several of these provi-
sions do not seem necessary. Furthermore, there are concerns that emerge from 
the  methodology applied in drafting the DCFR, as well as the wider literature sur-
rounding consumer guarantees. This article will first analyse the DCFR provisions 
on  guarantees and will argue that many of these appear to lack a sound basis in 
* Doctor; Reader in Law and Convenor of the Trade and Commercial Law Centre, University of Hull, 
UK.
1 Generally, see C. Twigg-Flesner, Consumer Product Guarantees (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
2 C. Von Bar, E. Clive & H. Schulte-Nölke (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European 
Private Law – Draft Common Frame of Reference (‘DCFR’) (Munich: Sellier, 2009).
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national law. In addition, questions are raised about the ‘best solution’ approach 
(which underpins the development of the ‘model rules’ in the DCFR), illustrated 
by briefly outlining the two dominant theories regarding the function of consumer 
goods guarantees. By drawing on research from the wider social science literature, it 
will be argued that many of the DCFR provisions on consumer goods guarantees are 
unnecessary. In a final section, the limited impact of these DCFR provisions on the 
acquis review will be noted.
 2. An Overview of the DCFR Provisions on Consumer Guarantees
Guarantees are already subject to European legislation through Article 6 of the 
Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC). All the Member States have implemented 
this provision, and while many have simply followed Article 6, there are some vari-
ations.3 One might therefore expect the DCFR to do more than simply restate the 
acquis. This section will provide an overview of the provisions on consumer guar-
antees in the DCFR. They can be found in Book IV, section A, Chapter 6, Articles 
IV.A.-6:101–108. As well as analysing the substance of these rules, it will be consid-
ered how these ‘model rules’ were developed. Although the notes for the DCFR are 
not yet available, reference can be made to the corresponding provisions in the Prin-
ciples of European Law – Sales (PELS),4 which form the basis for this chapter in the 
DCFR. While the wording of the respective DCFR and PELS provisions may differ 
slightly to reflect their particular context, there appears to be no significant substan-
tive difference. The PELS notes should reveal the material that formed the basis for 
drafting the particular ‘model rules’ in the DFCR.
2.1 Definition of ‘Consumer Goods Guarantee’ (Article IV.A.-6:101)
The definition of ‘consumer goods guarantee’ is fairly detailed. It is designed to 
cover undertakings given by a producer or other links in the business chain, as 
well as a seller where these are in addition to the seller’s obligations as seller of the 
goods, to a consumer in connection with a consumer contract for the sale of goods. 
This definition recognizes that it will usually be the final seller who will have specific 
obligations towards the consumer in accordance with the relevant provisions of sales 
law, and that a guarantee given by a seller can only be an additional obligation. Pre-
sumably, this is merely intended to clarify that guarantees cannot substitute for the 
seller’s legal obligations, and the latter remain unaffected. Although it is not entirely 
clear from the way this provision is drafted, at first sight, it seems that there is no 
expectation that a guarantee given by a seller would have to provide something above 
3 H. Schulte-Nölke, C. Twigg-Flesner & M. Ebers, EC Consumer Law Compendium (Munich: Sellier, 
2008), 436–437 and 446–447.
4 E. Hondius et al., Principles of European Law – Sales (‘PELS’) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008).
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and beyond the consumer’s legal rights. However, if one considers Article IV.A.-
6:103(1)(b), which requires that the guarantee document sets out the advantages of 
the guarantee compared to the conformity rules, one suspects that there might be an 
intention to introduce a requirement to add to consumer’s legal rights. Overall, this 
remains rather vague.
The undertakings given by a producer or seller may include:5
(a) that the goods will remain fit for their ordinary purpose for a specified period of 
time, or otherwise, unless this is caused by misuse, mistreatment, or accident;
(b) that the goods will meet the specifications set out in the guarantee document or 
the associated advertising; or
(c) subject to any conditions stated in the guarantee, the goods will be repaired 
or replaced, the price reimbursed wholly or in part, or some other remedy be 
 provided.
This tries to encapsulate the various ways in which a guarantee may be designed 
by the guarantor but is not intended as an exhaustive list.6 Subparagraph (b) reflects 
the definition of ‘guarantee’ found in the Consumer Sales Directive,7 whereas sub-
paragraphs (a) and (c) reflect the kinds of undertakings usually found in guarantees. 
What is surprising is that there is no reference to the fact that many guarantees, 
especially those given by manufacturers, tend to refer expressly to faults, which can 
be attributed to poor workmanship or faulty materials during the manufacturing pro-
cess, although this kind of situation would be covered by the catch-all phrase ‘subject 
to any conditions stated in the guarantee’.
A further element of this definition is that it does not restrict the term ‘con-
sumer goods guarantee’ to guarantees given free of charge. This means that guaran-
tees that are paid for, including ‘extended warranties’, would fall within the scope 
of this chapter. It might also overcome any problems associated with attempts by a 
guarantor to escape the application of the rules on guarantees by introducing a nom-
inal charge for them.8
2.2 Binding Nature of Guarantee (Article IV.A.-6:102)
Article IV.A.-6:102(1) confirms that guarantees are binding undertakings, irrespec-
tive of whether they are contractual or ‘unilateral undertakings’. In case of the lat-
ter, it is specified to be binding without any act of acceptance, ‘notwithstanding any 
provision to the contrary in the guarantee document or the associated advertising’. 
5 Article IV.A.-6:101(2).
6 Cf. PELS, 355.
7 Article 1(2)(e) of Directive 99/44/EC. Cf. Art. 2(18) of the proposal for a Consumer Rights Direc-
tive (COM(2008) 614 final) and the discussion in the final section of this article.
8 PELS, 356.
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To this, Article IV.A.-6:102(3) adds that formal requirements such as registration 
of the guarantee or notification of purchase are not binding on a consumer, either. 
This is quite a significant development of the position provided for in the Consumer 
Sales Directive. Article 6(1) states that a guarantee ‘shall be legally binding ... under 
the conditions laid down in the guarantee statement...’,9 which does permit requir-
ing compliance with formal obligations such as registration of the guarantee before 
it is binding on the guarantor and available to the consumer. The DCFR rule seems 
surprising; as noted above, guarantees are essentially given voluntarily by a manu-
facturer or retail seller, and their decision to offer such guarantees may be based on 
a range of factors. Those may include the setting of certain conditions to be fulfilled 
by a consumer, such as registering the guarantee with the guarantor. Provided these 
are not unduly onerous or unfair, there seems no reason why these should not be 
respected.
A further interesting provision is that a guarantee should also be binding in 
‘favour of every owner of the goods within the duration of the guarantee’,10 unless 
the guarantee document provides otherwise. In essence, therefore, the default posi-
tion is that guarantees are freely transferable unless there is an express term in 
the guarantee that limits this to the consumer who first purchased the goods from the 
business seller. The Consumer Sales Directive did not address this question, and the 
number of jurisdictions where such a rule exists appears to be small. The PELS notes 
identify four countries where this appears to be regulated directly (Belgium, Finland, 
France, and the Netherlands), and others where general rules on the assignment of 
rights could be utilized. One may therefore question the basis for this particular rule 
in the DCFR. There are clearly good reasons why a guarantee should be transferable 
to subsequent owners: Consumers may wish to sell goods or give them away as a pres-
ent during the guarantee period, and there seems to be no convincing reason why 
the recipient should be deprived of the benefit of the guarantee (apart from the chal-
lenges posed by contract law, if strict rules of contractual privity apply).11 However, 
the PELS notes do not articulate the reason why this particular rule was chosen – 
support in the national laws of the EU Member States seems rather limited. It is there-
fore difficult to accept this as a ‘best solution’ without further  justification.
One possible explanation is that this rule accords with the general approach 
in the DCFR that rights to performance are assignable as a matter of principle (see 
Article III.5-105(1) DCFR).12 However, in order to effect an assignment, there has to 
be an ‘act of assignment’, that is, a ‘contract or other juridical act’.13 The  provision in 
9 Emphasis added.
10 Article IV.A.-6:102(2).
11 Cf. Twigg-Flesner, 101–103.
12 I am grateful to Matthias Storme for drawing this to my attention.
13 Article III.-5:101(1) DCFR.
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Article IV.A.-6:102(2) on the binding nature of a guarantee is not expressed in terms 
of an ‘assignment’, so one would have to regard the transaction by which the first 
consumer purchaser transfers ownership of the corresponding goods to a subsequent 
consumer (whether by gift or subsale) also as an act of assignment, which might be a 
generous interpretation. If this were the explanation, then the justification for this 
rule would be the same as that for the general principle of assignability. If that is 
the case, one might ask, though, why this was not stated in such terms in Article 
IV.A.-6:102(2), that is, rather than expressing this in terms of the ‘binding nature 
of a guarantee’, a statement that ‘a guarantee is assignable in accordance with Book 
III, Chapter 5’ might have provided more clarity. However, there is a further diffi-
culty with this analysis: Article IV.A.-6:102(2) applies ‘unless otherwise provided in 
the guarantee document’, which suggests that the guarantor could insert an express 
term into the guarantee document that the guarantee is not transferable to subse-
quent owners of the corresponding goods. However, Article III.-5:108(1) DCFR 
states that a ‘contractual prohibition of … the assignment of a right does not affect 
the assignability of the right’, which would mean that a term in the guarantee docu-
ment restricting the benefit of the guarantee to the first consumer would be ineffec-
tive.14 So there remains some uncertainty as to the basis for this rule.
2.3 Guarantee Document (Article IV.A.-6:103)
There are fairly detailed requirements regarding the guarantee document. A basic 
requirement is that whenever a guarantee is given, the consumer has to be given a 
guarantee document. This must contain the following details:
(a) It has to state that the consumer has legal rights that are not affected by the guar-
antee. This is an important element of any guarantee, because guarantees often 
overlap with these legal rights. A clear statement that these rights are unaffected 
at the very least draws the consumer’s attention to the fact that a guarantee is not 
the full extent of his rights if something should go wrong with the corresponding 
goods.
(b) It has to point out the advantages of the guarantee for the buyer in comparison 
with the conformity rules. This is a surprising requirement, because it appears 
to be based on the assumption that a guarantee has specific advantages that 
could be pointed out. As discussed above, it is not entirely clear whether there is 
an expectation that a guarantee should provide something above and beyond the 
legal rights of a consumer. It seems that the significance of this provision will 
turn on how the word ‘advantage’ is understood. Thus, the mere fact that a manu-
facturer offers any kind of guarantee could be an advantage in that the  consumer 
14 For serious concerns about the appropriateness of this rule, see S. Whittaker, The ‘Draft Common 
Frame of Reference’ – An Assessment (London: Ministry of Justice, 2008), 167–168.
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is able to seek a remedy from a party not directly liable to the consumer in law. 
However, even a guarantee given by the final seller could be an advantage in 
that this would offer a basic reference point as to how that seller is most likely to 
respond to consumer complaints.15 However, if the ‘advantage’ effectively has to 
be something that adds substantively to consumers’ legal rights, then this could 
become quite an onerous obligation on any guarantor. It has to be remembered 
that there is no obligation to offer guarantees and that guarantees are essentially 
an aspect of the marketing strategy of a manufacturer or retailer. If there is too 
much intervention in the substance of guarantees, then there may be a backlash 
in that manufacturers might cease to offer such guarantees altogether. While 
the comments to the corresponding PELS provisions require an indication of 
‘the advantages, if any’,16 suggesting that there is no overriding requirement to 
exceed the legal rights of consumers, it is also suggested that this requirement 
would ‘counteract guarantors for providing guarantees with no additional, or 
even less protection’17 than that given in law, suggesting a normative position 
that guarantees should go above and beyond the legal rights.
While there is clearly a risk that consumers may be mislead by guarantees 
and assume that the guarantee is the full extent of their rights if goods are faulty, 
a clear reference to the existence of consumers’ legal rights, perhaps together 
with a short summary, would seem to be sufficient.18
The PELS notes suggest once more that there is only a very limited basis 
for this requirement in the national laws. Denmark, Estonia, Spain, and Nor-
way appear to have a firm requirement in this regard,19 but it certainly does not 
appear to be a widely accepted requirement across Europe.
(c) The guarantee also has to contain all the ‘essential particulars’, which are needed 
for claiming under the guarantee. These include:
– name and address of the guarantor;
– name and address of the person to be notified with a claim, as well as the 
procedure for notifying that person; and
– territorial limitations to the guarantee.
This provision reflects Article 6(2) of the Consumer Sales Directive, although that pro-
vision also treats the ‘duration’ of the guarantee as an essential particular. It is surpris-
ing that such a core aspect of the guarantee has been omitted from the list of ‘essential 
particulars’, although one might suspect that ‘duration’ is implicitly covered.
15 Cf. the discussion further below.
16 PELS, 368. Emphasis added.
17 Ibid.
18 Cf. Twigg-Flesner, 116–121.
19 PELS, 374. See also Schulte-Nölke et al., 446–447.
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In addition, the guarantee document has to be drafted in plain, intelligible 
language,20 which corresponds with Article 6(2) of the Consumer Sales Directive. 
Furthermore, there is an obligation to draft the guarantee document in the same 
language as that in which the goods were offered.21 Intuitively, this might sound 
like a good idea, but one can raise the question whether such a rule would work eas-
ily in practice. For example, if a shop assistant in a retail store in Malta happens to 
be able to speak Bulgarian and sells a digital camera to a Bulgarian tourist, would 
that trigger the obligation to provide the guarantee in Bulgarian? A more appropri-
ate rule might be to require the official language of the country in which the goods 
were sold. Although many manufacturers are able to produce multilingual guarantee 
documents, it seems rather onerous to require a retail seller to arrange for the trans-
lation of their guarantee, just because they happen to be able to communicate with a 
customer in another language. For comparison, Article 6(4) of the Consumer Sales 
Directive permits Member States to specify the languages in which guarantee docu-
ments have to be written in respect of goods sold in their territory, an option taken 
up by fourteen countries.22
As already implied by the use of the word ‘document’, the guarantee docu-
ment has to be provided in textual form on a durable medium. Both are terms that 
are defined in the DCFR. ‘Textual form’ means a statement ‘expressed in alphabeti-
cal or other intelligible characters by means of any support which permits reading, 
recording of the information contained in the statement and its reproduction in tan-
gible form’.23 ‘Durable medium’ is defined as ‘any material on which information is 
stored so that it is accessible for future reference for a period of time adequate to the 
purposes of the information, and which allows the unchanged reproduction of this 
information’.24 The key point is that a consumer has to be able to refer to the guar-
antee statement when necessary, and this provision seeks to provide an appropriate 
rule to ensure this.
A failure to comply with these requirements does not affect the validity of 
the guarantee, and a consumer can still require the guarantor to honour his obli-
gations under the guarantee.25 It is further provided that a consumer can require 
a guarantor to provide a guarantee document that complies with the requirements 
of Articles IV.A.-6:103(1) and (2), which seems to be an interesting form of ‘spe-
cific performance’. This is expressed to be ‘without any right to damages which 
20 Article IV.A.-6:103(1)(d).
21 Article IV.A.-6:103(1)(e).
22 Schulte-Nölke et al., 437.
23 Definitions in Annex.
24 Ibid.
25 Article IV.A.-6:103(3).
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may be  available’.26 Finally, the provisions of Article IV.A.-6:103 are deemed to 
be mandatory, that is, they may not be excluded or varied to the detriment of the 
 consumer.27
2.4 Coverage of the Guarantee (Article IV.A.-6:104)
Article IV.A.-6:104 contains default provisions, which apply where the guarantee 
document does not contain provisions to the contrary. Thus, if nothing is said about 
the duration of the guarantee, then the default period is the shorter of either five 
years or the estimated life span of the goods.28 Why this particular time period was 
chosen is not clear, and while it is not uncommon, it does seem to be longer than 
many guarantees currently offered. The reference to ‘estimated life-span’ as an alter-
native measure seems to be a sensible balance for goods that will last for a shorter 
period than five years, but it might be difficult to work out just how long that might 
be in practice and could therefore give rise to some discussion between consumer 
and guarantor.
Second, the guarantor’s obligations become effective if, during the period 
of the guarantee,29 the goods ‘become unfit for their ordinary purpose or cease 
to possess such qualities and performance capabilities as the guarantee holder 
may reasonably expect’,30 except where this is caused by misuse, mistreatment or 
accident.
Third, the guarantor’s obligations would be to repair or replace the goods, 
provided that the conditions of the guarantee are satisfied.31 Finally, the guarantor is 
to bear all the costs involved in invoking and performing the guarantee.32
While the idea of a ‘default guarantee’ may sound attractive, there is once 
more rather limited support for such a rule in the national laws of the Member States. 
The Consumer Sales Directive does not contain any default provisions. It seems that 
only the laws in Poland and Slovenia,33 as well as Malta,34 contain default provisions. 
In the case of the former two countries, these are found in respect of ‘mandatory 
guarantees’, rather than voluntary guarantees. There is no clear justification for 
establishing a default guarantee generally, or for the particular default positions 
adopted in this Article, in the national laws of the Member States. One would have 
therefore have to look elsewhere for convincing reasons to introduce such a default 
26 Article IV.A.-6:103(4).
27 Article IV.A.-6:103(5).
28 Article IV.A.-6:104(a).
29 Which might either be a stated period, or the default period under para. (a).
30 Article IV.A.-6:104(b).
31 Article IV.A.-6:104(c).
32 Article IV.A.-6:104(d).
33 PELS, 377.
34 Schulte-Nölke et al., 447.
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guarantee, but this may be difficult; indeed, any default guarantee could have the 
effect of setting a minimum standard for all guarantees that guarantors might feel 
compelled to adopt but that could make offering a guarantee less attractive for some 
manufacturers or retailers.
2.5 Limitation to Specific Parts (Article IV.A.-6:105)
Article IV.A.-6:105 provides that where the guarantee only covers a specific part or 
specific parts of the goods, then this has to be made clear in the guarantee docu-
ment, otherwise the guarantee will apply to all of the goods and the restriction will 
not be binding. In essence, this is a straightforward transparency rule. According to 
the PELS notes, there is only one country that has adopted a clear rule in this respect 
(Sweden),35 so such a rule is not particularly common. It also seems redundant: An 
exclusion such as this would have to be clearly stated in the guarantee in accordance 
with general rules of law, and if it is absent, then the presumption would indeed be 
that the guarantee covers all of the goods. It does not seem to be a particularly con-
troversial rule because what it says is self-evident, but for the same reason, the need 
for this specific provision may be doubted.
2.6 Exclusion/Limitation of Liability for Non-Compliance with 
Maintenance Instructions (Article IV.A.-6:106)
A further transparency rule is Article IV.A.-6:106, which permits the guarantor 
to exclude or limit his liability under a guarantee for any failure of, or damage to, 
the goods, which is caused by failure to maintain the goods in accordance with any 
instructions given. Such an exclusion/limitation has to be clearly stated in the guar-
antee document to be effective. Again, this is a provision that is generally not found 
in the national laws of the Member States. The Consumer Sales Directive leaves it up 
to the guarantor to specify the conditions on which a guarantee is offered. As with 
Article IV.A.-6:105, this is a self-evident rule – any exclusion from or limitation to 
the scope of a guarantee must be stated clearly.
Strangely, this provision does not deal with circumstances where having to 
comply with the maintenance instructions in question might operate unfairly on the 
consumer, although the comments to the corresponding PELS provision give the 
example of an unreasonable obligation to have maintenance carried out by an autho-
rized provider only.36 Such a restriction could probably be dealt with by using the 
provisions on unfair contract terms, and if it is unfair, then it would not be binding 
on the consumer.
35 PELS, 381.
36 Ibid., 383.
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2.7 Burden of Proof (Article IV.A.-6:107)
Article IV.A.-6:107 deals with the burden of proof once a consumer has invoked a 
guarantee within the guarantee period. The guarantor has the burden of proving 
that:
(a) the goods met the specifications contained in the guarantee document, or in the 
relevant advertising;
(b) the failure or damage to the goods was caused by misuse, mistreatment, 
 accident, a failure to maintain, or any other cause for which the guarantor is not 
 responsible.
This provision is also deemed to be a mandatory rule.
Once again, support in the national laws of the Member States for this rule is 
limited, with only the laws of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands containing rules that have the effect of reversing the burden of proof.37 
The comments to the PELS provision note that one of the major advantages of a 
guarantee is that it ‘automatically covers’ any defect that appears during the guar-
antee period. Surely, this is not the case for all guarantees and would depend on the 
precise undertaking given by the guarantor in the guarantee statement. In addition, 
it is stated that a consumer has to show that a defect exists in the first place,38 that is, 
he would have to demonstrate that the condition for invoking the guarantee is met. 
This could render this rule largely redundant, particularly if the guarantee is limited 
to very specific problems only.
2.8 Prolongation of Guarantee Period (Article IV.A.-6:108)
A final provision deals with the extension of the guarantee period in circumstances 
where the goods were not available to the consumer because a defect or failure in the 
goods had to be remedied under the guarantee. In those circumstances, the guaran-
tee period is extended for a period equivalent to the time when the consumer could 
not use the goods because of the fault.
This is also an issue not regulated in the Consumer Sales Directive, although 
according to the PELS notes, several countries (Estonia, France, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, and Sweden) appear to contain rules that have dealt with this 
issue.39 Intuitively, it seems sensible to introduce an explicit rule dealing with this 
question, although one cannot help but wonder whether such a provision could be 
applied usefully in practice.
37 Ibid., 386.
38 Ibid., 385.
39 Ibid., 388.
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 3. Evaluation
The provisions on consumer goods guarantees in the DCFR are a mixed bag of useful 
provisions that clarify the scope of the rules introduced by the Consumer Sales Direc-
tive and additional rules proposed as ‘best solutions’. There are instances where the 
drafting of the provision could be clearer, and these have been identified above.
The main concern, however, is with regard to the method by which particu-
lar provisions were deemed to be the ‘best solution’. In some instances, there was 
plenty of support for a rule in the national laws of the Member States; however, as 
highlighted above, there are several provisions with, at best, scattered support in 
national laws. While it is not entirely clear how one determines that a provision qual-
ifies as a ‘best solution’ where the national laws contain similar rules dealing with 
the same topic, it is even more questionable how one can do this where national laws 
are largely silent on a particular issue. If there is no clear basis in the national laws of 
the Member States (which includes the acquis), then there has to be some other solid 
foundation for proposing a rule as a ‘best solution’. As long as the DCFR has not been 
published with notes and comments, one has to refer to the relevant volume of the 
Principles of European Law, or of the Acquis Principles, to identify the reasons for 
adopting a particular provision. Unfortunately, at least in the context of consumer 
goods guarantees, consulting the PELS notes and comments reveals nothing useful. 
There is concern that for many provisions of the DCFR, the criteria applied in deter-
mining what qualifies as a ‘best solution’ remain unarticulated, suggesting a lack of 
‘proper justification in terms of principle, policy or technique’.40
There could be reasons other than a firm basis in the national laws for adopt-
ing a particular rule in the DCFR, such as research findings from economics, business 
studies, or consumer studies. Indeed, one of the criticisms levelled at the (interim) 
DCFR was that it failed to take into account research findings from other disciplines, 
which could inform the development of legal rules.41 Moreover, even those provi-
sions that have a basis in the acquis or in national law could be assessed against such 
research findings in order to consider whether they serve their intended purpose.42 
This, it seems, was not done at all, or at least not consistently, in the DCFR – while 
empirical evidence should perhaps not be the main basis for the ‘model rules’, it 
should at least be taken properly into account.43
The area of ‘consumer guarantees’ is certainly one where available research 
appears not to have been considered fully. The role of guarantees has given rise to a 
40 Whittaker, 38.
41 H. Eidenmüller et al., ‘The Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law – Policy Choices 
and Codification Problems’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (2008): 659–708.
42 F. Gómez, ‘The Harmonization of Contract Law through European Rules: A Law and Economics Per-
spective’, European Review of Contract Law 4 (2008): 89–118, 105.
43 F. Gómez, ‘The Empirical Missing Link in the Draft Common Frame of Reference’, <www.indret.com>, 
2009, 1 InDret.
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considerable theoretical and empirical literature in disciplines such as economics, 
marketing science, and consumer behaviourism. Although space precludes a thor-
ough engagement with this body of research in the present article, a brief flavour 
of the main strands is given in the following section. On the basis of this, it will be 
considered whether the DCFR provisions could justifiably be put forward as a ‘best 
solution’.
 4. Theories of Consumer Guarantees
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief outline44 of the different theories 
of the purpose of consumer guarantees that have emerged from the economics and 
social science literature. It will concentrate on the two dominant theories: First, 
there is ‘signalling theory’, which postulates that a guarantee is an indicator of prod-
uct quality and therefore enables a consumer to ascertain the quality of goods before 
purchase. Second, there is a growing body of research45 that regards consumer guar-
antees primarily as a mechanism for informal redress after purchase, if a fault with 
the goods has arisen. Having outlined the key features of these theories, it will be 
considered to what extent the DCFR provisions reflect the different functions of 
guarantees suggested by these theories.
4.1 Signalling Theor y
According to ‘signalling theory’, guarantees can indicate to a consumer, before 
deciding on a purchase, that the corresponding goods are of a particular level of 
quality.46 Thus, if a guarantee for a particular item is more generous to consumers, 
for example, in terms of duration or scope, than its competitors, then this might 
lead to the conclusion that the corresponding goods are also of better quality.47 
By using a guarantee as a signal, information about the quality of the goods can there-
fore be communicated reliably to consumers, unlike quality claims made in advertis-
ing.48 The signalling function of a guarantee assumes that there is a true correlation 
between the substance of the guarantee and the level of quality, and that a ‘wrong’ 
signal would result in costs to the guarantor in the form of having to offer a repair or 
44 For a fuller discussion, see Twigg-Flesner, Ch. 3.
45 See Twigg-Flesner, Chs 3–5 for a more detailed discussion of both theories and relevant empirical 
testing; see also G.L. Priest, ‘A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty’, Yale Law Journal 90 
(1982): 1297–1352, who also discusses ‘exploitation theory’ and his own ‘investment theory.’
46 Cf. Twigg-Flesner, Ch. 3.
47 Cf. J.L. Wiener, ‘Are Warranties Accurate Signals of Product Reliability?’, Journal of Consumer 
Research 12 (1985): 245–250.
48 Cf. S. Grossman, ‘The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Qual-
ity’, Journal of Law and Economics 24 (1981): 461–483.
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replacement under the guarantee.49 Signalling theory assumes that guarantees can 
be an integral part of the competitive process between different manufacturers. A 
benefit of this process would be an increase in the overall level of quality, because a 
manufacturer would not offer a more generous guarantee unless there is sufficient 
confidence in the quality of his goods to minimize the risk of having to provide a 
remedy under the guarantee.50
Although the basic tenet of signalling theory remains popular, there is grow-
ing evidence that it does not fully withstand empirical scrutiny. At a basic level, it 
may be difficult for consumers to understand the precise terms of a guarantee and, 
therefore, to evaluate correctly the signal that it may have been intended to send.51 
Moreover, the guarantee statement is rarely available before purchase, despite exist-
ing legislation requiring this, and will only be seen by a consumer after purchase.52 It 
is often more important to a consumer that a guarantee is provided than to know pre-
cisely what the guarantee contains.53 Empirical studies suggest that the number of 
actual situations where guarantees act as a ‘true’ signal of quality is limited. 54 Often, 
a manufacturer may not actually intend to utilize a guarantee as a means of signal-
ling quality; this may be because the longer the guarantee period, the greater the 
possibility that any faults that arise might have been caused by something other than 
a manufacturing fault and therefore be beyond the control of the guarantor. Indeed, 
consumers will take varying degrees of care of goods, and a more careless attitude 
could increase the chances of faults that were not due to manufacturing problems 
but caused by the consumer.55 So while signalling theory remains important, it needs 
to be borne in mind that the signalling function of guarantees is affected by a range 
of different factors.
49 M. Spence, ‘Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability’, Review of Economic 
Studies 44 (1977): 561–572.
50 J.A. Eddy, ‘Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act upon Consumer Product Warranties’, North Carolina 
Law Review 55 (1977): 835–877.
51 M.J. Trebilcock, ‘Manufacturers’ Guarantees’, McGill Law Journal 18 (1972): 1–44.
52 Article 6(3) of the Consumer Sales Directive (99/44) appears to permit a consumer to request sight 
of a guarantee statement before purchase. Compare the detailed presale availability rules in the US 
under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; see Twigg-Flesner, Ch. 6.
53 R.S. Adler, ‘The Last Best Argument for Eliminating Reliance from Express Warranties: “Real-
World” Consumers Don’t Read Warranties’, South Carolina Law Review 45 (1994): 429.
54 J.L. Gerner & W.K. Bryant, ‘Appliance Warranties as Market Signals’, Journal of Consumer Affairs 15 
(1981): 75–86; C.A. Kelley, ‘An Investigation of Consumer Product Warranties as Market Signals of 
Product Reliability’, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 16 (1988): 72–78.
55 W. Emons, ‘On the Limitation of Warranty Duration’, Journal of Industrial Economics 37 (1989): 
287–301.
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4.2 Guarantees as an Informal Redress Mechanism
The alternative view of guarantees is that, rather than operating as some sort of 
quality signal, they are primarily a mechanism for providing redress informally, 
should the goods develop a fault during the guarantee period. While it is true that 
a consumer will have specific legal rights that should protect him in this situation, 
experience shows that enforcing legal rights can be problematic without the assis-
tance of lawyers, and ultimately a judge, if the retailer refuses to comply. Where a 
guarantee is given, it provides an alternative mechanism to seek redress informally, 
often directly from the manufacturer, or via the retailer.
Empirical evidence in support of this theory is growing,56 and its fundamen-
tal assumptions appear to be in line with consumer behaviour.57 The literature on 
consumer complaining behaviour identifies essentially three categories of response 
to a consumer problem: take no action, private action (such as deciding not to buy 
goods from the particular brand, or from the particular retailer, again),58 and public 
action59, which includes a demand for redress, a simple complaint to the retailer or 
manufacturer without seeking redress, some other venting reaction (e.g., a letter to a 
newspaper or an entry on a relevant website).60 The choice of response depends on a 
number of different factors,61 such as the frequency with which the problem occurs, 
the price, the estimated life span of the goods,62 how difficult it is to seek and obtain 
redress,63 and the likely response of the manufacturer or retailer to a complaint.64 
A consumer would tend to address his complaint to the person most likely to respond 
to a complaint by providing suitable redress. If it is easier for a consumer to con-
tact the guarantor and to seek redress at low or no cost, then it is more likely that 
the guarantor rather than the retailer would be the consumer’s first port of call.65 
56 Seminally, J. Braucher, ‘An Informal Resolution Model of Consumer Product Warranty Law’, 
 Wisconsin Law Review (1985): 1405–1480; Twigg-Flesner, Ch. 4.
57 A. Best & A.R. Andreasen, ‘Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving 
Defects, Voicing Complaints and Obtaining Redress’, Law and Society Review 11 (1977): 701–742.
58 Cf. J.G. Blodgett & R.D. Anderson, ‘A Bayesian Network Model of the Consumer Complaint 
 Process’, Journal of Service Research 2 (2001): 321–338.
59 K. Morel, T. Poiesz & H. Wilke, ‘Motivation, Capacity and Opportunity to Complain: Towards 
a Comprehensive Model of Consumer Complaint Behaviour’, Advances in Consumer Research 
24 (1997): 464–469.
60 W.O. Bearden & J.B. Mason, ‘An Investigation of Influences on Consumer Complaints Reports’, 
Adv. C.R. 11 (1984): 490–495.
61 V.S. Folkes, ‘Consumer Reactions to Product Failure: An Attributional Approach’, JCR 10 (1984): 
398–409.
62 A. Broadbridge & J. Marshall, ‘Consumer Complaint Behaviour: The Case of Electrical Goods’, 
International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management 23 (1995): 8–18.
63 Best & Andreasen, 701–742.
64 M.L. Richins & J.V. Bronislaw, ‘Seeking Redress for Consumer Dissatisfaction: The Role of Attitudes 
and Situational Factors’, JCP 8 (1985): 29–44.
65 Bearden & Mason, 490–495.
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A guarantee therefore acts as an indicator to consumers just how willing the guar-
antor really is to receive and respond to complaints. If the guarantee makes it easy 
to seek redress, consumers will perceive the guarantor as willing to respond and 
address any complaints in that direction, rather than trying to enforce their legal 
rights against a reticent retailer. According to this view, guarantees are of primary 
relevance after purchase once a problem has occurred, and the signalling value of 
guarantees is, at best, secondary.66
4.3 Relationship with Legal Rules
A legislative provision based on the signalling function of a guarantee needs to make 
it clear to a consumer what sort of level of quality might be expected from the cor-
responding goods. In order for a guarantee to operate as a signal, the emphasis has 
to be on aspects that might convince a consumer about the quality of the goods, 
such as the guarantee’s duration. In order to facilitate this, it might be possible to 
standardize most of the terms of a guarantee and only leave open those aspects that 
reflect the main signal of the guarantee.67 This will generally be the duration of the 
 guarantee.
In contrast, in order to promote the use of guarantees as an informal redress 
mechanism, any relevant legislative provisions should focus on transparency and 
clarity of the guarantee statement, rather than creating standardized guarantees. 
A consumer has to be able to tell from the guarantee document whether the guar-
antor would be prepared to provide a remedy if the corresponding goods developed 
a fault during the guarantee period. According to this approach, consumers would 
only consult the guarantee after purchase, and only if a problem had arisen, so there 
is no need to minimize the amount of information on which a consumer has to focus. 
There is also no need to regulate the substance of a guarantee, because that would 
distort the consumer’s perception as to the likely responsiveness of the guarantor to 
a complaint.
4.4 Implications for the DCFR Provisions
Neither of the two positions outlined above provides particular support for the model 
adopted in the DCFR.68 A set of rules that would seek to utilize the quality-signalling 
function of a guarantee would have to reduce the freedom given to a guarantor to 
determine the substance of the guarantee to a small number of variables, primarily 
66 Cf. W. Whitford, ‘The Function of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions’, WisLR 68 
(1973): 400–470.
67 Eddy, 835–877.
68 See also T. Zerres & C. Twigg-Flesner, ‘Bedeutung und Funktion des Art. 6 VerbrKfRL für 
 Verbrauchergarantien – Eine Rechtsvergleichende Theoriegeleitete Betrachtung’, Zeitschrift für 
 vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 105 (2006): 19–54, 52–54.
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its duration.69 This would require the adoption of detailed provisions for a ‘standard 
guarantee’, leaving only matters such as the length of the guarantee period to be 
determined by the guarantor. Such a model was adopted in the United States in the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 1975 but has not been particularly successful.70
The ‘informal redress’ model requires a less interventionist approach,71 
 relying primarily on transparency and disclosure. Indeed, it would be more impor-
tant to have a disclosure rule requiring information on the procedure for claiming 
and associated costs, than to lay down any specific rules in that respect. Such an 
approach could tolerate the transparency rules in Articles IV.A.-6:105 and 106 but 
would not offer support for default guarantees such as that in Article IV.A.-6:104, 
or a specific rule on the prolongation of the guarantee period (Article IV.A.-6:108), 
because that would not assist a consumer in identifying the likely responsiveness of 
the guarantor to complaints about faulty goods.
Thus, had the drafting team for this part of the DCFR taken into account the 
rich empirical literature on the function of consumer guarantees, the ‘model rules’ 
that would have emerged might have been more in line with the practical use of 
guarantees.
 5. DCFR and the Acquis Review
Although the primary purpose of this article is to critique the DCFR provisions 
on consumer guarantees, a brief look at their (ir)relevance for the Acquis review is 
 merited. This final section, therefore, considers the extent to which the DCFR rules 
in this area are, or could be, utilized in the acquis review. The draft Consumer Rights 
Directive (‘pCRD’; COM (2008) 614 final) does not draw on any of the additional 
provisions in the DCFR.72 In the pCRD, the term ‘commercial guarantee’ is used 
instead of the simple ‘guarantee’ adopted in the Consumer Sales Directive. The defi-
nition remains very similar to the current definition, although one change is made: 
the qualification that the guarantee is ‘given without extra charge’ is not retained. 
This means that guarantees that can be purchased also fall within the scope of the 
pCRD. This matches the position in Article IV.A.-6:101(1) DCFR.
Although Article 29 pCRD essentially restates Article 6 of the Consumer 
Sales Directive, there are some changes.73 Thus, the reference to the consumer’s 
69 Cf. Trebilcock, 1–44, 29; Twigg-Flesner, 67.
70 See, e.g., E.M. Moore & F.K. Shuptrine, ‘Warranties: Continued Readability Problems after the 
1975 Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act’, J. Cons. Aff. 27 (1993): 23; Twigg-Flesner, Ch. 6.
71 Twigg-Flesner, Ch. 5.
72 This raises a wider question about the professed link between the (D)CFR and the Acquis review, 
which cannot be discussed here. See M. Hesselink, ‘The Consumer Rights Directive and the CFR – 
Two Worlds Apart?’, ERCL 5 (2009).
73 See also C. Willett, ‘Direct Producer Liability’, in Modernising and Harmonising Consumer 
 Contract Law, eds G. Howells & R. Schulze (Munich: Sellier, 2009), 194–198.
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legal rights is now linked directly to the rights given by Article 26 pCRD (remedies), 
rather than requiring merely a general statement about the existence of these rights. 
The proposed Consumer Rights Directive addresses the question of transferability 
of the guarantee, although not very clearly. Article 29(2)(c) pCRD states that if the 
guarantee is restricted to the original purchaser, there has to be clear information 
on this in the guarantee statement. This is subject to Chapter V on contract terms 
and paragraph 1(j) of Annex III in particular. This rebuttably presumes that a term 
‘restricting the consumer’s right to re-sell the goods by limiting the transferabil-
ity of any commercial guarantee provided by the trader’ is unfair and consequently 
not binding on the consumer. The effect would appear to be the same as that of 
 Article IV.A.-6:102(2), but the DCFR provision has the advantage of clarity and 
might therefore usefully be considered as a template (assuming that there is a clear 
justification for such a rule74.) As far as most of the DCFR provisions are concerned, 
however, the pCRD contains no corresponding articles. In light of the criticism made 
about the DCFR rules, this is not an unwelcome development, although it does raise 
questions about the future use of the DCFR.
 6. Conclusions
The DCFR provisions on consumer goods guarantees go significantly beyond the 
minimum requirements already established in Article 6 of the Consumer Sales Direc-
tive. That in itself need not be problematic; however, as the preceding discussion has 
shown, many of the additional provision seem to lack a sound basis: Neither is there 
sufficient commonality in the national laws of the Member States, nor has it been 
demonstrated that there are other sound reasons for proposing some of these rules. 
Others seem redundant because they are stating the obvious, such as the two disclo-
sure provisions on specific parts and maintenance instructions.
Perhaps the desire to specify fairly detailed rules on guarantees is motivated 
by the fact that the DCFR does not contain any rules on direct producer liability. As 
guarantees are often given by producers, introducing more detailed rules on guaran-
tee might offer a ‘back-door’ towards tighter regulation of the producer’s position. 
However, that would be inappropriate. Any regulation of guarantees should either 
respond to identified problems, or support the specific purposes that such guaran-
tees might fulfil. Unfortunately, the DCFR rules on consumer goods guarantees do 
neither.
74 Cf. the discussion above.
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